October 22, 2009

Illinois Courts Provide Requirements For A Joint Venture or Partnership to Exist

Illinois courts have held that for a partnership or joint venture to exist a written agreement may not be required as long as specific requirements are satisfied. The Uniform Partnership Act defines a partnership as “an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners of a business for profit." 805 ILCS 205//6(1) (West 2002). “A relationship between two or more parties may be considered a partnership by the courts if the parties join together to carry on a venture for their common benefit, each contributing property or services and having a community of interest in the profits of the venture." Kennedy v. Miller, 221 Ill.App.3d 513, 521, 163 Ill Dec. 934, 582 N.E.2d 200 (1991). “Partnership legal principles govern joint ventures and the only distinction of consequence between the two is that a joint venture relates to a single enterprise or transaction, whereas a partnership relates to a general business of a particular kind.” Dremco, Inc. v. South Chapel Hill Gardens, Inc., 274 Ill.App.2d 534, 538, 211 Ill.Dec. 39, 654 N.E.2d 501 (1995). Even though a written agreement may not be necessary, a bald assertion that a partnership or joint venture exists is not sufficient to plead the existence of such a relationship. Romanek, 324 Ill.App.3d at 405, 257 Ill.Dec. 436, 753 N.E.2d 1062. Therefore, the courts generally look for some sign of a venture for common benefit between the two parties and in particular for some indication of a sharing of profits. Landers-Scelfo v. Corporate Office Systems, Inc., 356 Ill.App.3d 1060, 827 N.E.2d 1051, 293 Ill.Dec. 170 (2005).

Informational Purposes Only: The content of this writing was prepared by Tamari & Blumenthal, LLC for informational purposes only. The content of this writing is not intended to constitute and does not constitute legal advice. Reading the content of this writing or communicating with our office staff or attorneys by telephone, fax or e-mail does not make you a client of Tamari & Blumenthal, LLC. To become a client, you must sign and return our governing engagement agreement. Persons reading the content of this writing should not act upon this information without contacting and speaking with an attorney. Do not issue or provide us with confidential information until an attorney-client relationship has been formally established with our firm.

About Tamari & Blumenthal, LLC: Tamari & Blumenthal, LLC is a business litigation firm. Litigators Walid J. Tamari and Grant Blumenthal practice in the law firm's complex litigation practice group.

October 24, 2008

Illinois Courts Generally Hold Adhesion Contracts As Lawful

An adhesion contract is a standardized form agreement prepared entirely by one of the parties and submitted to another party for acceptance without any opportunity to negotiate terms. Endsley v. City of Chicago, 319 Ill.App.3d 1009, 1019 (1st Dist. 2001). Further, a contract of adhesion is a contract that is offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to a party who has no bargaining power and no ability to change the terms of the contract. Wigginton v. Dell, Inc., 890 N.E.2d 541, 546 (5th Dist. 2008). Therefore, a contract of adhesion exists where one party has absolutely no bargaining power or ability to change the contract terms. Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 359 Ill.App.3d 976, 987 (5th Dist. 2005).

Where there is disparity in bargaining power, the drafter may essentially require the other party, or "adherer," to accept or reject the form contract on a "take it or leave it" basis. Illinois Jurisprudence, Commercial Law § 1:4. Whether a contract is one of adhesion is itself a question of fact. Id. Burdensome clauses in adhesion contracts generally should be construed against the drafter of the contract.

Illinois courts have held that contracts of adhesion are generally lawful and "mere disparity of bargaining power is not sufficient grounds to vitiate contractual obligations.” Endsley v. City of Chicago, 319 Ill.App.3d 1009, 1019 (1st Dist. 2001). To vitiate a contractual obligation under an adhesion contract, something more than mere disparity in bargaining power is required. Illinois Jurisprudence, Commercial Law § 1:4. To determine whether a contract of adhesion is enforceable, Illinois courts look to two factors: the reasonable expectations of the adhering party and whether the contract is unconscionable. Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 342 Ill.App.3d 109, 120 (1st Dist. 2003). Thus, Illinois courts may declare adhesion contracts unlawful where the party in the superior bargaining position has taken unfair advantage of the adherer by making the desired product or service available only if the weaker party accedes to the form of the contract. Illinois Jurisprudence, Commercial Law § 1:4. Therefore, unfair advantage is the key to differentiating between lawful and unlawful adhesion contracts. Id.

Contracts of adhesion, typified by terms that are nonnegotiable and presented in fine print in language that the average consumer might not fully understand are not per se unenforceable from a procedural standpoint. Tortoriello v. Gerald Nissan of N. Aurora, Inc., 379 Ill.App.3d 214, 233 (2d Dist. 2008). Some additional coercion or overreaching is necessary. Id. The Illinois First District Appellate Court held that when contracts of adhesion are in a standardized form agreement and are submitted to a party for acceptance without any opportunity to negotiate the terms, the mere fact that one party to a contract enjoyed little relative bargaining strength cannot alone render a contractual provision unenforceable. Larned v First Chicago Corp., 264 Ill.App.3d 697 (1st Dist. 1994). However, a contractual clause that is part of a standardized form agreement may have some of its significance reduced because of the inequality in the parties' bargaining power. Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship Commission, 139 Ill.2d 24, 72 (1990).

Informational Purposes Only: The content of this writing was prepared by Tamari & Blumenthal, LLC for informational purposes only. The content of this writing is not intended to constitute and does not constitute legal advice. Reading the content of this writing or communicating with our office staff or attorneys by telephone, fax or e-mail does not make you a client of Tamari & Blumenthal, LLC. To become a client, you must sign and return our governing engagement agreement. Persons reading the content of this writing should not act upon this information without contacting and speaking with an attorney. Do not issue or provide us with confidential information until an attorney-client relationship has been formally established with our firm.

October 23, 2008

Illinois Courts Determine What Is Sufficient Consideration To Establish A Valid Contract

For a contract to be legally binding, it must be supported by consideration. Illinois Jurisprudence, Commercial Law § 1:32. Illinois courts have held that consideration is one of the requirements to prove that a valid contract exists. Meyers v. Woods, 374 Ill.App.3d 440, 450 (3d Dist. 2007).

Whether there is sufficient consideration to establish that a valid contract exists is a question of law. Illinois Jurisprudence, Commercial Law § 1:34. The burden of proving that there is sufficient consideration is on the party seeking to enforce the contract. Id. The sufficiency of consideration must be evaluated as it relates to the entire record, not as perceived in a vacuum of either terms or definitions. Illinois Jurisprudence, Commercial Law § 1:35. The burden of proving the sufficiency of consideration is upon the party asserting it. Id.

Generally, Illinois courts will not inquire into the sufficiency of the consideration to support a contract. United City of Yorkville v. Village of Sugar Grove, 376 Ill.App.3d 9, 22 (2d Dist. 2007). As long as the consideration is a bargained-for exchange, the amount the parties assign to a particular asset constitutes legally adequate consideration. Illinois Jurisprudence, Commercial Law § 1:36. Moreover, Illinois courts have held that a court's inquiry into whether a contract is supported by consideration does not extend to examining the adequacy or sufficiency of the consideration. Gavery v. McMahon & Elliott, 283 Ill.App.3d 484, 490 (1st Dist. 1996). Illinois courts have stated that it is not a court's function to review the amount of consideration. Id.

Moreover, Illinois courts have held that mutual and concurrent promises provide sufficient legal consideration to support each other. Solimini v. Thomas, 293 Ill.App.3d 430, 437 (2d Dist. 1997). Where there is no other consideration for a contract, the mutual promises of the parties constitute the consideration. Illinois Jurisprudence, Commercial Law § 1:48. However, these promises must be binding on both parties, or the contract fails. Id. If a promise is merely illusory, in that it does not bind one party, that promise will not constitute consideration and will not support a contract. Id.

However, Illinois courts have held that where the amount of consideration is so grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court, the consideration is insufficient and the contract will fail. United City of Yorkville, 376 Ill.App.3d at 22. Upon such inquiry, adequacy and sufficiency of consideration is to be determined as of the time the parties entered into the contract. Illinois Jurisprudence, Commercial Law § 1:36. Evidence of gross inadequacy of consideration has been considered by some Illinois courts as tantamount to fraud, whether actual or constructive. Illinois Jurisprudence, Commercial Law § 4:16. Mere inadequacy of consideration, in the absence of fraud or unconscionable advantage, ordinarily is insufficient to justify setting aside a contract. Gavery, 283 Ill.App.3d at 490-91.

Illinois courts have found that consideration does not exist where a promise to do something one is already obligated to do. Illinois Jurisprudence, Commercial Law § 1:40. The pre-existing duty rule provides that where a party does what it is already legally obligated to do, there is no consideration as there is no detriment. Id. Illinois courts have held that consideration cannot flow from an act performed pursuant to a pre-existing legal duty. Id. Furthermore, consideration is not insufficient merely because it is a conditional promise, even though the controlling event may never occur. Illinois Jurisprudence, Commercial Law § 1:38. Where the consideration is a party's promise to perform in the future, the consideration does not fail because of non-performance, since the promise, and not the performance, is the real consideration. Id.

Informational Purposes Only: The content of this writing was prepared by Tamari & Blumenthal, LLC for informational purposes only. The content of this writing is not intended to constitute and does not constitute legal advice. Reading the content of this writing or communicating with our office staff or attorneys by telephone, fax or e-mail does not make you a client of Tamari & Blumenthal, LLC. To become a client, you must sign and return our governing engagement agreement. Persons reading the content of this writing should not act upon this information without contacting and speaking with an attorney. Do not issue or provide us with confidential information until an attorney-client relationship has been formally established with our firm.


October 3, 2008

Offer and Acceptance of a Valid and Enforceable Contract

An issue in Illinois is what constitutes a sufficient offer and acceptance to establish a valid and enforceable contract. To prove that a valid contract exists, a party must prove the following elements: (1) offer; (2) acceptance; and (3) consideration. Meyers v. Woods, 374 Ill.App.3d 440, 450 (3d Dist. 2007). To prove an enforceable contract, a party must additionally prove that the agreement is sufficiently definite so that its terms are reasonably certain and able to be determined, and a meeting of the minds or mutual assent to the terms of the contract. Van Der Molen v. Washington Mut. Finance, Inc., 359 Ill.App.3d 813, 823 (1st Dist. 2005); In re Marriage of Murphy, 359 Ill.App.3d 289, 301 (3d Dist. 2005).

Mutual assent is proven when both parties assent to the same thing in the same sense, and their minds must meet on the essential terms and conditions of the agreement. Illinois Jurisprudence, Commercial Law § 1:16. Mutual assent may be manifested by the language employed by the parties or by their words or acts. Id. To satisfy the meeting of the minds requirement, it is not necessary that the parties share a subjective understanding as to the terms of the contract. Id. Rather, it is sufficient that their conduct indicates an agreement to those terms. Id. The intention of the parties gives character to the transaction, and if either party contracts in good faith, that party is entitled to the benefit of the contract, no matter what may have been the intention of the other party. Id.

An offer is an act on the part of one person giving another person the legal power to create the type of obligation necessary for a contract. Illinois Jurisprudence, Commercial Law § 1:19. Illinois courts have held that in order for a valid contract to be formed, an offer must be so definite as to its material terms or require such definite terms in the acceptance that the promises and performances to be rendered by each party are reasonably certain. In re Marriage of Murphy, 359 Ill.App.3d 289, 300-301 (3d Dist. 2005). If a contract offer does not state a definite limitation on the time period for its acceptance, it will lapse if not accepted within a reasonable time. Kalis v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 357 Ill.App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 2005). Whether a party's acceptance has come within a reasonable time “depends upon a multiplicity of circumstances” and should be resolved by the trier of fact. Id.

Illinois courts have held to be a valid acceptance, it must be objectively manifested, for otherwise no meeting of the minds would occur. Cowger v. Industrial Com'n, 313 Ill.App.3d 364, 370 (5th Dist. 2000). To create an enforceable contract, there must be an unequivocal acceptance. Illinois Jurisprudence, Commercial Law § 1:24. There can be no contract where the offeror cannot reasonably treat the offeree's response as an acceptance. Id. Furthermore, an offer cannot be accepted by one to whom it is not made. Illinois Jurisprudence, Commercial Law § 1:25. Because an offeror has a right to determine with whom he or she will contract, a non-offeree cannot be forced upon the offeror without consent. Id. There is no acceptance until the offeree notifies the offeror of the acceptance, or at least employs reasonable diligence in attempting to do so. Illinois Jurisprudence, Commercial Law § 1:26. Thus, it is well-established by Illinois courts that in order to constitute a contract by offer and acceptance, the acceptance must conform exactly to the offer. Finnin v. Bob Lindsay, Inc., 366 Ill.App.3d 546, 548 (3d Dist. 2006).

An offeror has complete control over an offer and may condition acceptance on the terms prescribed in the offer. Illinois Jurisprudence, Commercial Law § 1:27. The language of an offer may govern the place, time or manner of acceptance required, in which case the acceptance must strictly comply with these terms in order to create a contract. Id. Thus, where an offer requires a written acceptance, no other mode may be used. Id. On the other hand, if an offer merely suggests a method of acceptance, it does not preclude a different method. Id.

A well-established rule of Illinois contract law is that a counteroffer rejects an offer only when made before a contract is formed. Patel v. McGrath, 374 Ill.App.3d 378, 383 (2d Dist. 2007). Under Illinois contract law, an acceptance requiring any modification or change in terms to the original offer constitutes a rejection of the original offer and becomes a counteroffer that must be accepted by the original offeror before a valid contract is formed. Finnin v. Bob Lindsay, Inc., 366 Ill.App.3d 546, 548 (3d Dist. 2006). Responding to an offer with a counter-offer constitutes a rejection of the original offer. People v. Henderson, 211 Ill.2d 90, 103-104 (2004). Moreover, a conditional acceptance of an offer is not a sufficient acceptance, rather, the conditional acceptance becomes a counteroffer to the original offer. Karris v. U.S. Equities Development, Inc., 376 Ill.App.3d 544, 550 (1st Dist. 2007). An offer deemed rejected due to the proffering of a counteroffer or conditional acceptance cannot be revived by a later acceptance. Henderson, 211 Ill.2d at 103-104 (2004).

An offer can be accepted by the performance of a desired act. Illinois Jurisprudence, Commercial Law § 1:30. An offeree may also be regarded as having accepted a tendered contract offer by accepting the benefits of the contract. Id. Conduct may suffice to show acceptance of the terms of an offer. Illinois Jurisprudence, Commercial Law § 1:30. A party named in a contract may, by its acts, indicate its acceptance of the contract's terms and become bound by its provisions. Id. However, for a course of conduct to act as acceptance, it must be clear that the conduct relates to the specific contract in question. Id. The law ordinarily treats the offeree's silence or failure to decline a proposal as rejection, not acceptance, of an offer. Illinois Jurisprudence, Commercial Law § 1:31. However, circumstances such as the nature of previous dealings between the parties may make it reasonable for the offeror to construe silence as acceptance. Id. For this purpose, a single previous transaction does not establish a course of conduct or course of dealing sufficient to constitute an implied acceptance based on silence. Id. Generally, a contract is operative as such from the time when there is a meeting of the minds, or when the last act necessary for its completion is performed. Illinois Jurisprudence, Commercial Law § 1:15.

Informational Purposes Only: The content of this writing was prepared by Tamari & Blumenthal, LLC for informational purposes only. The content of this writing is not intended to constitute and does not constitute legal advice. Reading the content of this writing or communicating with our office staff or attorneys by telephone, fax or e-mail does not make you a client of Tamari & Blumenthal, LLC. To become a client, you must sign and return our governing engagement agreement. Persons reading the content of this writing should not act upon this information without contacting and speaking with an attorney. Do not issue or provide us with confidential information until an attorney-client relationship has been formally established with our firm.